INTRODUCTION

With the passage of the Maritime Areas Act in January 1992, Belize took an important, if controversial, step towards the definitive solution of the territorial dispute with is neighbor Guatemala.

Belize became independent on 21 September 1981 with a claim over its entire territory still being vigorously pressed by Guatemala, necessitating the continued presence of British troops.

And while Belize's future is obviously closely related to Central America, it has hitherto been isolated from other countries in the isthmus because of the lingering Guatemalan claim. It now seems that at last, after a long history of frustrated attempts at settlement, this anachronistic claim will be resolved, giving the people of Belize the peace and security they have sought for so long.

BEGINNINGS

The original inhabitants of Belize were the Maya, whose highly advanced civilization reached its peak in the years 250 to 1000 A.D. After the society went into decline, however, the Maya continued to inhabit the territory in scattered villages and communities. The Spanish, who claimed the territory as part of the Americas granted them by the Pope, encountered the Maya in the 16th and 17th centuries, but they failed to permanently subdue them, and the Spanish never settled the territory.

By the middle of the 17th century, British pirated had been using Belize's treacherous coastline as a base to plunder Spanish ships, and by the end of the century some enterprising pirated switched to logwood cutting to supply the dye industry in Europe. They established permanent settlements in Belize. By the third quarter of the 18th century their major activity was the export of mahogany, which required them to move further inland and to import more Africans as slaves.

Meanwhile, the Spanish continued to assert sovereignty over the territory; during the 18th century they attacked the British settlers, and on four occasions (1717, 1730, 1754, 1779) forced them to leave. In the peace treaties of 1763 and 1783, however, Spain, while reserving its sovereignty, accorded to the British settlers the right to cut and export logwood from the Hondo to the Belize River. And in 1786 Spain agreed to extend the limits southward to the Sibun, and to allow the export of mahogany as well, but the settlers were forbidden to establish fortifications, plantations or a system of government.

Spanish authorities asserted their right to inspect the settlement between 1787 and 1796, but the outbreak of war in Europe in that year ended those visits; a Spanish attack on the settlement in 1798 was repulsed, and although Spain continued to claim sovereignty, and the British to acknowledge it, the British settlers established de facto sovereignty during the first years of the 19th century.

Not only that, but they rapidly extended the limits of the settlements beyond those set by the 1786 agreement. By the 1820's, when Spain was ousted from the area by the various Independence movements in the Americas, the settlers had penetrated as far south as the Sarstoon; at that time the population was about 4000.

Although the United Provinces of Central America and, after its dissolution in 1839, Guatemala, claimed sovereignty over Belize as an "inheritance" from Spain, the British never accepted such claims since neither Spain nor any Central American entity had ever occupied the territory. In 1840 Britain declared that "the law of England is and shall be the law of this settlement or Colony of British Honduras."

Not until 1862, however, did the British officially declare Belize to be a colony.

THE ANGLO GUATEMALAN TREATY, 1859

By that time, Britain had signed a boundary treaty with Guatemala as part of a series of actions designed to regularize Britain's position in Central America in the face of the assertion by the United States of America of the "Monroe Doctrine" of 1823, which forbade interference by any European power in the newly emerging Latin American republics.

In 1850 the U.S. and Britain concluded the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, agreeing that neither would colonize any part of Central America, leaving in doubt Britain's already existing domination over Belize, the Mosquito Shore and the Bay Islands.

A further treaty negotiated in 1856 (Dallas-Clarendon), however, agreed that the Mosquito Shore should revert to Nicaragua and the Bay Islands to Honduras, but with regard to Belize it said: "That Her Britanic Majesty's Settlement called British Honduras, on the shores of the Bay of Honduras, bounded on the North by the Mexican province of Yucatan, and on the south by the river Sarstoon, was not and is not embraced in the (1850) Treaty," and it called for the limits of Belize to be settled by treaty between Britain and Guatemala within two years.

Although, for reasons unrelated to Belize, the Dallas-Clarendon treaty was not ratified, Britain proceeded to carry out its terms by direct negotiations with the three parties concerned, concluding treaties with Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua in 1859 and 1860.

The 1859 treaty between Britain and Guatemala defined the boundaries between Belize and Guatemala as those, which exist to the present day. It constituted recognition by Guatemala of a pre-existing frontier and a pre-existing sovereignty over Belize by Britain.

It was not, therefore, a treaty of cession, as Guatemala later claimed, although Article 7 of the Treaty committed both parties to conjointly use their best efforts to establish communication by cart road and rivers between Guatemala City and the Atlantic Coast of Guatemala, near the settlement of Belize.

At various times in the following years Britain variously offered a cash settlement and proposed alternatives such as a railway link, but no agreement was ever consummated, and by the end of the century it seemed to have been forgotten. Indeed in 1931 the two countries exchanged notes after joint commissioners had placed concrete monuments on parts of the frontier, stating that "these monuments forms parts of the boundary line between British Honduras and the republic of Guatemala."

Guatemala raised no question about Article 7 then, but began to do so two years later, and in 1940 it declared that the 1859 treaty had become void because of the failure to implement Article 7, arguing that the treaty was a disguised treaty of cession, Article 7 representing compensation. Since the treaty was void, they argued, the territory reverted to Guatemala, and a new Guatemalan constitution in 1945 declared Belize to be Guatemalan territory.

But by that time, however, Belize was experiencing the first stirrings of the nationalist movement among its population of about 60,000: over the past century and half, history had fashioned a new people - neither British nor Guatemalan, but Belizeans.

To the indigenous Maya and the Africans and their descendants, successive waves of migration had added Indian, Garifuna, Mestizo, West Indian and other peoples to Belize.

They had evolved a multi-cultural identity out of their environs and experience, which was quite different from that which, prevailed in Guatemala. The Independence movement grew rapidly in the 1950's and by 1961, following the U.N. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, Britain agreed that Belize could proceed to independence whenever it so desired.

NEGOTIATIONS

One obstacle remained, however: Guatemala, the most powerful country in Central America, with a large army and a history of military dictatorships, continued to press its claim to the territory and to back this up with the threat of force. The modern series of negotiations attempting to resolve the dispute began in 1962 when elected Belizean representatives joined the British delegation in direct negotiations with the Guatemalans.

The following year Britain agreed to a new self-government constitution for Belize, and Guatemala subsequently broke off diplomatic relations with Britain.

In 1965 the parties agreed to submit the dispute to mediation by U.S. President Johnson, but when his mediator, Bethuel Webster, submitted proposals in 1968 which would lead to effective Guatemalan dominion over Belize, the people of Belize rejected the proposals. Talks begun in 1971 were abruptly terminated the following year when Guatemalan plans to invade, assisted by El Salvador, were frustrated by the reinforcement of British troops.

And in 1975, when talks were resumed, Guatemala demanded the cession to it of the southern quarter of Belize in return for recognizing the independence of the rest.

It became clear to the Belize government that after 13 years of fruitless negotiations under the British, the Guatemalans had in fact hardened their position, and that a radically new approach, involving a major Belizean initiative, would have to be taken.

The support of the world's nations would have to be enlisted, and Belize itself must lead this campaign, since Guatemala's position, for which she had Latin American support, was that a European power had usurped Latin American territory and was holding it against the true wishes of its people.

INTERNATIONALIZATION

With CARICOM and Commonwealth support already assured, Belize approached the Non Aligned Movement's Conference of Foreign Ministers in Peru in 1975, and won a declaration of unconditional support for its independence and territorial integrity. An "Office of the Belize Representative" was established in New York and countries were lobbied to support Belize.

In 1975, the General Assembly of the United Nations passed a resolution affirming Belize's right to a secure independence with all its territory and declared that any proposals that may emerge from negotiations between Britain and Guatemala must respect this right.

Guatemala condemned this as an inadmissible attempt to dictate the outcome of negotiation, and declared that it would not be bound by the resolution.

The vote of 110 in favor, 9 against and 16 abstentions was a great victory for Belize, but there were two serious drawbacks: except for Cuba, no Latin American country supported the resolution, and the United States also refused to vote in its favor.

Belizean diplomats then concentrated on winning those votes. In Central America, they carried out an intensive campaign with trade unions, political parties and movements, other civic groups and individuals and the media, and gained an impressive level of public support urging governments to side with Belize. Even within Guatemala they gained the support of many such groups, despite Guatemalan edict declaring such support punishable as treason. And in the United States they lobbied senators and congressmen and Latin American solidarity groups, apart from direct talks with the State Department.

The first major breakthrough came in 1976, when Panama's President Omar Torrijos, who was seeking Non Aligned support for a new Canal treaty, threw in his lot with Belize and initiated an intensive campaign of his own to win other Latin American countries to the Belize cause. Only the year before, Panama, along with the other five Central American countries, had signed a joint declaration supporting Guatemala.

Realizing the enormity of Panama's desertion of its cause, Guatemala promptly broke off diplomatic relations, but the following year, Mexico, Venezuela, Argentina and Peru also voted for Belize. In 1978 Costa Rica and Colombia followed suit, and in 1979, after the triumph of the Sandanista revolution, Nicaragua, until then Guatemala's staunchest ally, threw all its weight behind Belize. A majority of the Central American countries now supported Belize's situation that had appeared impossible only three years before.

All these resolutions called for negotiations to continue and in a series of talks between 1975 and 1980, punctuated by a couple of threatening moves by Guatemala (the most serious, in 1977, necessitating massive British reinforcement), Guatemala, while reducing the size of its demand, continued to insist on land cession. During this time both Britain and the United States leaned heavily on Belize to persuade it to give up at least a small strip of land in the south.

Since Belize's only effective defence against a Guatemalan invasion was the presence of British troops, and since the U.S. power to restrain the Guatemalan military was deemed to be crucial, it was not easy for Belize to resist these pressures and still maintain the support of these powers. This was done by skillful negotiation and with critical support of CARICOM countries and the effectiveness of the Special Committee of Ministers of the commonwealth, which had been formed to assist Belize.

A CRITICAL YEAR

1980 was an absolutely critical year for Belize. The vast majority of Latin American states were prepared to support Belize.

The United States was also coming around to support Belize, but it was President Carter's last year in the White House, and there was no telling what the policy of his successor would be.

In Central America the success of the Nicaraguan revolution has sparked change in El Salvador, and Guatemala itself was having to give increasing attention to its own insurrectionist movement.

Cuba, a strong supporter of Belize's cause, was the current chair of the Non Aligned Movement and the Commonwealth, with a West Indian as its Secretary General, was strengthened by its role in the resolution of the Zimbabwe crisis.

Internally Belize had just emerged from an election based squarely on the independence issue, with a fresh mandate to lead Belize to an early independence. It seemed to be one of those moments in history when you either seize the time and go for it, or risk being left behind by the tide of history.

Belize decided to go for it. It introduced a daring resolution at the United Nations with three new critical elements. It declared that Belize should become independent by the follo9wign year.

It called on Britain and Guatemala to continue to seek an agreement, but insisted that this could not prejudice Belize's movement to independence.

And it not only called on Britain to continue to guarantee the security and territorial integrity of Belize, but also requested the relevant organs of the United Nations to facilitate the attainment of Belize's independence and to guarantee its security and territorial integrity thereafter.

Of the 139 countries that voted for the resolution, one was Britain itself and another was the U.S.A. All the members of the Security Council voted for it; no country voted against. This victory was capped when the OAS, until then considered Guatemala's turf, itself endorsed this resolution.

In December 1980 Britain announced the convening of a constitutional conference to agree on an independence constitution, but Belize was not yet in the clear, since Britain was still refusing to provide a defence guarantee, arguing that greater effort must be made to reach a settlement with Guatemala.

HEADS OF AGREEMENT

Talks held in early 1981, however, failed to provide a solution and in March, Britain prevailed on Guatemala to sign a document agreeing to recognize the Independent State of Belize "and respect its sovereignty and territorial integrity in accordance with the existing and traditional frontiers."

This is itself was a tremendous achievement, since Guatemala was not only agreeing to Belize's independence and full sovereignty, but also relinquishing its claim to any Belizean territory.

This, however, was made conditional on the completion of treaties to give effect to certain clauses in the document. The document was called "Heads of Agreement," and it listed a number of areas subject to negotiations; if such negotiations proved fruitful and agreement was reached, Guatemala would drop its claim and recognize Belize's independence.

Most of the clauses, however, were subject to widely different interpretation, and Belize and Guatemala were very far apart in interpreting the, - which is of course, which it was necessary to merely list the topics for further negotiation.

The agreement established a joint commission of Belize, Guatemala and Britain to prepare draft treaties to give effect to its provisions.

As far as Belize was concerned, it was working to a timetable requiring it to become independent that very year, and it was clear that the partied were so far apart on the critical issues that it would be impossible to arrive at any agreement in time.

Belize had to agree to the process of negotiation, however, if it were to gain Britain's assurance of a defence guarantee, which had become an indispensable prerequisite to a secure independence at that time. On the other had, any delay might have resulted in Belize losing the favorable conditions of the regional and international conjuncture.

Unfortunately, some persons in Belize interpreted the "Heads" in the way that Guatemala was interpreting them, and on that basis decided that it represented a sell-out of Belize to Guatemala. As a result, serious riot broke out which resulted in the imposition of a state of emergency.

But the joint commission appointed by the agreement proceeded to negotiate. As was predicted, the talks failed to reach any common ground, and in July Britain persuaded that it was useless to try any further.

The, and only them, did Britain agree to maintain its troops ion Belize as a defence guarantee and Belize proceeded to independence without having arrived at a settlement with Guatemala, but with its territory and sovereignty intact.

THE EFFECTS OF INDEPENDENCE

Once Belize was independent, its position with regard to negotiations with Guatemala was enormously strengthened. And with every passing day, as it consolidated its independence and established relations with ever more countries, Guatemala's claim became less and less plausible and its threat of force less and less credible.

In an important respect, however, Belize's independence was compromised by the need to keep British forces in the territory as a defence against a possible Guatemalan aggression.

Until the dispute was definitively resolved and Guatemala dropped her claim, Belize would in a sense remain at the mercy of the British, who could use the continued presence of their forces to limit Belize's sovereign will, whether in relation to negotiations with Guatemala or otherwise.

Although already independent, therefore, it remained necessary for Belize to seek a negotiated solution. In any case, although the other Central American countries recognized Belize, Guatemala was still able to block Belize's participation in certain initiatives that could redound to its development.

CHANGE IN GUATEMALA

But Guatemala needed time to adjust having "lost" Belize, as well as to make a negotiated solution more feasible. In 1985, a civilian government headed by President Vinicio Cerezo was elected in Guatemala and tentative approaches between the two governments began to materialize.

By that time, too, there had been a change of government in Belize, with the United Democratic Party under Prime Minister Manuel Esquivel assuming office.

An important victory for Belize came in December 1985, when the OAS agreed to suspend the operation of Article 8 of its Charter in five years' time. This article had prevented Belize from becoming a member of that organization. After the article fell in December 1990, Belize became a member of the OAS in January 1991, with Guatemala's blessing.

In 1987, meanwhile, a bi-partisan commission of four government and two opposition House members began serious negotiations with Guatemala, Belize maintaining its position on the territorial integrity of its continental and island territories, and discussing issues like the maritime boundary and economic cooperation proposals on land and sea.

There developed in these negotiations the understanding that the essence of a negotiated solution lay in Guatemala accepting Belize's traditional borders and in Belize agreeing to limits its territorial sea claims in the south.

TERRITORIAL SEA

Belize, as a British Colony, has never claimed a territorial sea of more than three miles, that being long standing British policy. Indeed, the international resolutions affirming Belize's territorial integrity often referred to its "traditional and existing frontiers," which clearly included a territorial sea of three miles, and this is what the new State of Belize acquired upon attaining independence.

In 1982, however, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea accorded every country a right to claim twelve miles of territorial sea, thereby opening the way for Belize to extend its territorial sea to twelve miles. The Convention also declared that, where adjacent states were each unable to claim twelve miles because of the short distance between the two, each would be entitled to claim up to the median line.

Guatemala had, since 1939 claimed territorial sea of twelve miles, but the British government had consistently refused to acknowledge such a claim. Still, Belize only claimed three miles of territorial sea, and Guatemala had acted in accordance with the reality of claiming only three. If Belize were, in 1982, to claim its full rights under the new international law, this would have the effect of closing off Guatemala's access to the high seas except by passing through either Belizean or Honduran territorial waters. Clearly, Guatemala would regard this as an hostile act.

It would have been foolhardy for Belize to attempt this, and in any case, it is certain that Britain, which remained committed to Belize's defence, would not have allowed it; that is to say, it would refuse to assume a defence responsibility which would have become necessary in the event of such action.

Both the PUP (which returned to office in September 1989) and the UDP governments, therefore, wisely refrained from making any formal territorial sea claim, conscious that this would be an important card in negotiations aimed at Guatemala dropping its claim to Belize.

RECOGNITION OF BELIZE BY GUATEMALA

The negotiations were suspended in August 1990, as Guatemala went into an election campaign. The new President, Jorge Elias Serrano, had publicly stated that he would press for an early resolution of the dispute, but his first months in office were taken up with the internal national reconciliation process.

The process that led to the recognition of Belize by Guatemala and to the establishment of Diplomatic relations between the two countries is described as follows in a publication of the National Bi-partisan Commission (made up of leaders of government and the opposition) of October 1991:

In July 1991, it was agreed to resume talks, the first one to be at the level of officials. At a meeting in Miami attended on behalf of Belize by Ambassador Robert Leslie, the Guatemalans activated the process to allow for the quick recognition of Belize and the establishment of full diplomatic relations.

On 14th August 1991 the Guatemalan government declared that "it recognizes the right of the Belizean people to self-determination," and announced that it will continue negotiating and will exhaust all legal and proper procedures which lead to a definitive settlement of the territorial dispute.

On 16th August 1991, the government of Belize, after consultation with the Opposition, introduced a bill in the National Assembly for an Act to provide for the territorial sea, internal waters and exclusive economic zone of Belize.

In introducing the bill, it was noted that the effect of it would be to allow Guatemala access to the high seas through its own territorial waters, and that this should be considered "as a sign of good faith on the part of Belize to pursue negotiations with the Republic of Guatemala in search of a settlement of the outstanding dispute."

On 5th September 1991, the British government issued a statement saying that "in recognition of the political and economic scope of this decision) of Guatemala to recognize Belize) and wising to support the development of full and normal relations between Belize and Guatemala, HMG have agreed to commit L22.5 million as an initial contribution to launching the joint project to renew and extend the road network linking the two countries…"

On 11th September 1991, the governments of Belize and Guatemala announced their decision to establish full diplomatic relations with immediate effect and to exchange Ambassadors at the earliest opportunity.

THE MARITIME AREAS BILL

Belize, however, had yet to pass the Maritime Areas Bill. Conscious of the extreme sensitivity of Belizeans to anything to do with Guatemala, the Bi-partisan Commission decided to tour all district towns to explain the Bill to the people before passing it into law.

In October 1991, Prime Minister Price, Foreign Minister Said Musa and Opposition Leader Esquivel toured the country in support of the Bill, but they met some unexpected opposition.

At first the complaints centered around Belizean fishermen who erroneously thought they were losing fishing rights that they had previously enjoyed, but this later spread to wider demands in some quarters that Belize should give up absolutely nothing to Guatemala.

After the round of public consultations and after hearing the views expressed by several organizations, the government decided to amend the Bill before passing it in the House.

The amended Bill declared a territorial sea of twelve miles, except for an area in the south from the Sarstoon river, Belize's southern boundary with Guatemala, to the Ranguana Caye, where a territorial sea of three miles is proclaimed.

It also declared an exclusive economic zone of two hundred miles, all these distances being measured from the declared baseline, in accordance with international law.

Belize is fortunate in that its topography allows it to declare a baseline nor from the low water mark along the coast as is normally the case, but rather by straight baselines joining appropriate points along its reef, cayes and atolls.

All the waters to the landward side of the baseline become Belize's internal waters, equivalent to every respect to its land territory. This already gives Belize an enormous area of sea as internal waters.

From that baseline the law accords Belize 12 miles as territorial sea from its border with Mexico to Ranguana Caye in the south; thereafter, from Ranguana Caye to the Sarstoon River, Belize claims a territorial sea of three miles.

Because of the topography of the areas between Belize and Guatemala in the south, the sea boundary between Belize and Guatemala is governed by Article 15 of the Law of the Sea Convention, which states: "Where the coasts of the two States are opposite or adjacent to each other neither of the two states is entitled, failing agreement between them to the contrary, to extend its territorial sea beyond the median line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest point of the baselines from which the breath of the territorial seas of the two states is measured."

Because of its own topography, Guatemala is able to benefit from Article 10 of the Convention, which allows a baseline to be drawn across the entrance points of a bay.

Guatemala is therefore able to claim a closing line across the Bay of Amatique, and this line becomes part of its baseline.

But because of Article 15 of the Convention, Guatemala's territorial sea cannot extend beyond the median line between the baselines of Belize and Guatemala, unless and until Belize were to agree by treaty with Guatemala to vary the present situation.

The mere fact that Belize passed an internal law claiming no more than three miles in the south does not mean that I forgoes the right to claim what it has the right to claim under international law, nor does it mean that Guatemala can lay any kind of claim to it.

This is clear from an interpretation of international law and the Maritime Areas Act, not out of legal necessity, but in order to make it clearer to the Belizean people, actually spells it out. In addition, government has taken steps internationally to make this abundantly clear.

The Maritime Areas Act says that the area between the three-mile limit and the median line is merely reserved for the time being to negotiate a sea boundary with Guatemala.

In other words, it is contemplated that some part of that area will be offered to Guatemala in negotiations, with a view to allowing Guatemala access to the high seas through its own territorial sea.

If an agreement is reached, the proposal will be put to a referendum in Belize. If the people approve the proposal, the law will be amended to extend Belize's full entitlement under international law - that is, to the median line or the twelve-mile limit where that applies.

Of course, the difference would be that in the former case Guatemala would finally drop its claim, whereas in the latter case the claim would continue to bedevil future generations of Belizeans.

In the meantime, that area between the three-mile limit and the median line becomes part of Belize's exclusive economic zone.

EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE

There are differences in a country's rights with regard to its territorial sea and its EEZ. In the territorial sea a country exercises sovereignty; this extends to the air space above the territorial sea as well as to its bed and subsoil.

The major limitation on a country's full sovereignty over the territorial sea is the right of innocent passage, which the ships of all states enjoy. Passage means passing over the sea without entering internal waters or calling at a port, as well as proceeding to or from internal waters or calling at a port.

And passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal state. Acts of pollution, research or fishing, for example, are not allowed as part of innocent passage. Warships do have rights to innocent passage, but only if they comply with laws and regulations of the coastal state.

In the exclusive economic zone on the other hand, the coastal state has sovereign rights over all the natural resources of the zone in the waters, sea bed and subsoil, and generally with regard to any activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone.

It also has jurisdiction with regard to the establishment and use of any artificial structures, research and the protection of the environment. But the EEZ is NOT considered part of the high seas, which are open to all states. Article 86 of the Law of the Sea convention specifically states that "high seas" do not include the EEZ.

In short, the Maritime Areas Bill extended Belize's territorial sea from its traditional three miles to twelve miles for most of its coast line, while maintaining it at three miles in the south for a temporary period until negotiations with Guatemala produce an agreement as to ho much of that area Belize will cede to Guatemala in order to assure it access to the high seas through its own territorial waters and for agreeing to drop its claim.

Such a proposal would have to be agreed by Belizeans in a referendum, failing which Belize would claim the full amount allowed by international law. In the meantime, that reserved area will be Belize's exclusive economic zone, giving it, to the exclusion of all others, sovereign rights over all the resources of that zone, something it had not claimed before.

FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS

Although Guatemala has recognized Belize it had not formally abandoned its claim. In any case, there is a need to define the maritime boundary between the two countries. Future negotiations will focus on this issue - in effect, on the location and size of the sea corridor that Guatemala requires in return for formally dropping its claim. Other issues will also be discussed, such as the use of ports and joint exploitation of a part of Belize's EEZ-not necessarily that part in the south.

Belizeans are a reasonable people. They know from their own experience, for example, that one should not deny one's neighbor a right of way out of her property if the desire is to live in peace and harmony.

Indeed, the negotiators might be assisted by the wording of the relevant article in the Heads of Agreement of 1981: "Guatemala shall be accorded such territorial seas as shall ensure permanent and unimpeded access to the high seas." It is clear that only part of the area reserved by the Maritime Area's Act is necessary to achieve that objective.

While a few Belizeans have questioned the need to negotiate with Guatemala at all, stating that its claim is totally unfounded, the vast majority understands that, although unfounded, the claim exists, and has been regarded as an article of faith by generations of Guatemalans.

It is only in the recent Guatemalan Constitution that the clause stating that Belize is a part of Guatemala was removed and replaced with a clause empowering the President to seek a solution to the dispute and requiring the proposed solution to be put to the people in a referendum.

Indeed, president Serrano took a very bold step when he recognized the State of Belize and, necessarily, the territory that State encompasses. Almost all the political forces in Guatemala have vigorously condemned him for doing so.

Some allege that his act was unconstitutional and have taken him to court, while others lament the fact that he thus gave up the most important card in Guatemala's negotiating deck.

But the act is done, and, in accordance with article VI of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the rights and Duties of States, to which Guatemala is a party, such recognition is unconditional and irrevocable.

President Serrano's foreign minister resigned in protest at the move, and many powerful forces in Guatemala are opposing his attempts to solve the dispute once and for all. It is certainly not in Belize'' interest to give comfort to such forces by taking an intransigent position.

THE NEED TO NEGOTIATE

What is more, there is such a thing as reality, which has to be faced. Belize cannot take what would generally be regarded internationally as an unreasonable position and then expect others to protect Belize from the consequences of such action.

Of course, Guatemala has absolutely no valid claim to Belize, and Belizeans have succeeded in convincing the world of the justice of their cause, but that can never be a reason to refuse to negotiate; and negotiations always involve some attempt at compromise.

What can give Belizeans comfort is that they will end up getting less than they have a right to claim in terms of territorial sea. Not many countries enter such negotiations with that type of assurance.

Compare for example, the case of the Palestinians, who are fighting to sit at the negotiating table with a power that forcibly usurped their land, expropriated their property and submitted them to a system every bit as oppressive as apartheid.

Or consider Mandela and the African National Congress negotiating with white supremacists for a peaceful transition to majority rule, something that is the unquestionable right of the African people whose age old homeland was usurped by the whites.

The point is that you negotiate precisely because there is disagreement.

Belizeans are also understandably wary of Guatemala because of its long history of military dictatorship and its record of the abuse of human rights. But no one is asking us to approve the internal situation in Guatemala. The objective of the negotiations is to find a settlement to the dispute, one, which will allow the Guatemalan government to drop its claim to Belize and establish the kind of good neighbor relations that will be mutually beneficial to both countries.

TIMES HAVE CHANGED

Belizeans should become aware that there have been significant changes in Guatemala's position with regard to Belize over the past few years, particularly after the "Belice es Nuestro" clause was removed from the constitution. We should not continue to react to Guatemalan initiatives as it we were still in the bad old days, when Guatemala's military massed troops on the border and threatened to invade us. Times have changed, and our attitudes must keep pace with the times.

As Foreign Minister Said Musa said when he addressed us on the occasion of constituting the National Advisory Commission:

"It is encouraging to put on record the fact that for some time now relations between Belize and Guatemala have been typified by respect and understanding, particularly after diplomatic relations were established between our two countries on the 11th September, 1991. An incident, which occurred in early February, demonstrates the quality of this new relationship. After an advertisement appeared in an oil magazine published in Texas, inviting tenders for exploration in certain areas and the accompanying map showed an area which Belize has claimed as its EEZ under the aforementioned Act I, sought clarification from the Guatemalan government. Guatemala's Foreign Minister Gonzalo Menendez Park, wrote me a letter the following day, 13th February, 1992, indicating that the description of the area had not been consulted with the Ministry of External Affairs, that it was an involuntary error and that this area will not be allotted to any tenderer. He further assured me that the next tender notice due to be published in June will only contain areas already duly delimited so as not to give rise to any misinterpretations.

"This response makes it clear to the Government of Belize that the Guatemalan Government understands and accepts the effect of the Maritime Areas Act, i.e. that by it Belize does not abandon its right to claim the affected area as its territorial sea, but merely reserves it for negotiation and in the meanwhile it has the status as part of Belize's exclusive economic zone.

"With regard to adjacent states as well as to all states of the world, therefore the situation of the affected are is that Belize has declared that area as part of Belize's exclusive economic zone.

"With this clear understanding it is possible to proceed to negotiations which will hopefully lead, within a reasonable time, to mutually acceptable agreements which will enable Guatemala to formally drop its claim with regard to Belize and allow our two countries to enjoy the friendly and respectful relations both our peoples have long desired."

The Foreign Minister went on to say: "These are indeed extraordinary times, times when the solution of long standing regional conflicts by peaceful means is firmly on the agenda. The international and regional conjuncture favors the attainment of an honorable settlement which will enable to rid itself once and for all of the claim that has traumatized, divided and held back the development of the country for too long."

The cogency of his remark was punctuated by the fact that only a couple of months before, the government of El Salvador and the FMLN guerrilla had signed a peace treaty putting an end to a civil war in which 75, 000 people had been killed and millions displaced.

Two days before that, President Serrano declared to the Guatemalan Congress that his government was ready to sign a peace treaty with the Guerrilla movement in Guatemala. And the Salvadoran and Honduran Presidents met recently to discuss the creation of a "dry canal" through Honduras; these two countries had engaged in a bitter war only a few years ago that claimed many lives.

Those who insist on living in the past are condemned to lose the future. We must wake up to the fact that the world, and our region, has changed and it is time for us to put this anachronistic claim behind us and take the opportunity history now offers us. The Foreign Minister reminded us that: "Belize has a critical role to play in the region.

As both a Caribbean and Central American country, it can act as an effective link between the two sub-regions and help bring about the level of cooperation between them that is absolutely necessary if they are to survive and develop in a world increasingly determined by the effectiveness of regional economic blocs."

"But the immediate task is to negotiate a peaceful settlement with Guatemala, one that will be acceptable to the people of Belize as well as those of Guatemala. As it did in 1981, Belize must now seize the time and got for it, thereby sparing future generations the agony of living under a threat and of seeking solutions in a climate which may not be as favorable as the present climate now is."

LEGAL OBSTACLES

In the course of 1992, however, it became clear that the Guatemalan government's intention to move expeditiously towards a definitive settlement of the dispute was seriously affected by a virulent political campaign carried out in the congress and in the press against President Serrano's recognition of Belize. In particular, a case had been presented to the Constitutional Court challenging this recognition.

Understandably, the government of Guatemala felt constrained in carrying out any negotiations with Belize while this constitutional case was pending, and it took the courts much longer than originally anticipated to consider the case and reach a decision.

On 3rd November 1992, by a vote of 4 to 3, the court declared that the President's action in recognizing Belize did not violate the Guatemalan Constitution, but it referred several matters to the Guatemalan Congress for ratification.

On 24th November 1992, the Congress, by a vote of 78 to 24, with 13 abstentions, and after lengthy debate, approved the President's actions and authorized him "to continue negotiations, including the use of international courts, in order to validate Guatemala's territorial rights over Belize, and, upon arriving at a definitive settlement, to submit same to popular consultations in accordance in with Article 19 of the Guatemalan Constitution."

These events enable the Guatemalan Government to pursue negotiations with Belize. As a first step the Foreign Minister of Guatemala announced on 25th November 1992, that he will constitute a "Council on Belize" to advise his government on how best to proceed with the negotiations.

Belize stands ready at any time to continue the negotiations and with the same condition that and proposed definitive settlement must be first submitted to a referendum before final approval.

LISTEN WITHOUT PREJUDICE

We the members of the National Advisory Commission are determined to take out responsibility seriously, and we believe that an important part of our task is to keep the Belizean people informed about the fact surrounding the issues involved. An informed public is the only guarantee of success in this endeavor. We said as much to the minister at our first meeting, and he assured us of government's full support to carry out this work.

As persons who are independent of any political party, but who, because of our mandate, are cognizant of the issues, it is our hope that Belizeans will read and listen to our explanation without the hang-ups and prejudices we normally harbor toward persons belonging to a party other than our own. At the same time, we welcome comments, questions, and alternative interpretations. We do not claim to have all the answers or all the facts, and are open to ideas from any quarter.

CONTACT THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION

Please feel free to write us with your comments, questions and suggestions for future publications at:

National Advisory Commission
c/o Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Belmopan, Belize
Telephone: 08-22167;22322
Fax: 08-22854

Belmopan, February, 1993